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The history of white-collar and corporate crime in our nation
has been one of toleration. Throughout much of this century, the
victims, the government, and the criminal justice system have been
largely inactive in attempting to control this form of law-violating
behavior. Asa result, occupational and organizational crime offenders
have been treated preferentially in our courts when compared to
traditional or common crime offenders. Beginning in the 1970s,
however, public attitudes began to changeand the government and
criminal justice system were given a mandate to pursue these
offenders. This paper utilizes aggregate data on the U.S. District
Courts for the fiscal years ending June 30, 1964, 1974, and 1984,
and isdesigned to investigate whethera shift in criminal justice policy
(arising from public concerns overcorporate and white-collar crime)
has been put into effect. That is, have equitableoperational policies
for the adjudicationand sentencing of corporate, white-collar, and
common crime offenders evolved over the past three decades? The
~qryclu~io~sgrq,.!U~_frq1!1, t~~ data; suggest; t~fl.! wnile corporate; and- _
white-collarcriminalsare more frequently beingbrought to the at-
tention of the courts, and have beenreceiving more and moreserious
sanctions, they are still receiving more lenient penalties for theirac-
tions than are common property crime offenders.
INTRODUCTION
Since its inception, the American criminal justice system has been
~;[primarilyoriented toward the apprehension, prosecution, adjudication, and
I?:. punishment of working-class offenders who, by necessity and social place...
·:l:~·· menr, disproportionately engage in the more visible predatory acts of
:1:',traditionally-defined property theft and conversion (see Balkan, et al. 1980,~
~::-
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Simon and Eitzen, 1982; Thomas and Hepburn, 1983; Bequai, 1978).'
However, as Sutherland (1949) argued over a quarter of a century ago, the
existence of elite deviance in the form of white...collar and corporate offenses'
indicates that economically-motivated crime is not entirely a working-class
phenomenon. Upper-status members of society also engage in illicit acts for
the purposes of.acquiring money and capital. Since the time of Sutherland's
early writings, a growing amount of information has arisen which suggests
that the social and economic consequences of criminality are far more wide...
ranging than traditional theories and research focusing upon the lower classes
and their involvement in property offenses have led us to believe (see Balkan,
et al., 1980; Braithwaite, 1981; Bequai, 1978; Coleman, 1985; Little, 1983~
Meier and Short, 1982; Simon and Eitzen, 1982). In light of these changing
interpretations regarding the costs of crime, it has become equally impor-
tant to 'consider how the criminal justice system responds to differing forms
of crime on both the policy and operational levels.
When one- considers the property offenses of the working class, one -
typically thinks of such acts as burglary, robbery, larceny-theft, etc. The
images of what constitutes traditional or common crime in America are fairly'
uniforrnallv conceptualized and taken for granted. However, when one con-
siders the economically-motivated offenses of the middle and upper classes,"
conceptualization is less clear. We may distinguish between two broad classes'
of "elite" criminality: "white..collar" or "occupational" crimes and "corporate".-
or "organizational" crimes. White,collar offenses refer to those actions com..'::..
mitted by individuals or groups, either during the course of fulfilling their'..
legitimate occupational roles or as an illicit occupation, which are designed-
to economically benefit themselves through the use of nonphysical and non... ,.'
coercive means such as concealment, fraud,' and misrepresentation. These.
actions are designed to victimize individuals, groups, organizations, and agen-
cies. Typical examples of such offenses are embezzlement, forgery, mail and.
tax fraud. Corporate crimes are offenses carried out by (most typically high..:.
ranking) employees of an organization in the name of the firm's central goals
of growth and accumulation. Examples of these offenses include violations.
of laws governing worker and consumer safety, restraint of trade, and o~her
unfair labor and business practices. Thus, in the case of corporate cnme,.':
the business is the offender, while in the case of white..collar crime the busine.:~,:
is often the victim. r:·,·
The criminal justice system's long-standing justification for focusing i~s~~_',
resources and activities upon common property crimes has been the pubtiE"
"outcry" over such activities. The state and criminal justice system hav~.'·
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also attempted to create and perpetuate these anxieties (see Johnson and
Wasielewski, 1982). Historically, the public has been perceived as exhibiting
higher levels of anxiety over traditionally...defined predatory crimes than for
corporate and white-collar offenses. This has not only been taken as a
justification for a decreased concern over "elite" criminality on the part of
law enforcement agencies, but it has also provided the government with
its mandate to "get tough" with common crime offenders.
As a consequence of this ideology, our system of criminal justice has
been largely inoperative in combatting corporate and white-collar crime
because it has oriented an insignificant amount of its economic and per...
sonnel resources toward the containment of these activities (see Bequai, 1978;
Coleman, 1985; Skoler, 1980; Simon and Eitzen, 1982). In addition to such
regulatory inaction, official rhetoric has seldom, at least until quite recent,
ly, contained references to the problem of white-collar and corporate crime.
Moreover, the FBI uniform Crime Reports fail to include any white...collar
or corporate offenses among the list of "index" or serious crimes. Additionally,
there has been a notable lack of any thorough system of compiling, report
ing, and analyzing governmental data concerning the nature and extent
of these activities comparable to that developed to disseminate information
on the traditional property crimes of the working class (see Skoler, 1980;
Little, 1983; Simon and Ett.z~I), 1982; Bequai, 1978; Conklin, 1977).
Governmentally,compiled data on white...collar and corporate crimes
to date, however, have generally confirmed the findings of independent social
scientific research. Together these sources indicate that throughout this cen...
tury, white-collar and corporate criminals have not only less likely been
the targets of police investigation and arrest, but once apprehended they
have typically received much less severe penalties in our courts (Stotland,
1982"; Conklin, 1977; Katz, 1979; Simon and Eitzen, 1982). As Hagan, et .
al. (1980), Conklin (1977), and Wheeler, et al. (1982) have argued, to focus
upon the differential treatment of white-collar and corporate offenders, as
compared to their common crime counterparts, is to bring into focus an
image of the allocation of power and privilege in our society. In sum, not
only has it been less likely for the police and courts to become aware of
these activities given that they often do not occur in public settings where
they can easily be observed or detected by police agencies, but the system
has traditionally been more likely to respond to these actions with leniency
compared to other forms of illicit conduct involving property relations and
economic gain. It would appear, then, that the majority of evidence sug-
gests that for much of this century white...collar and corporate offenders have
27
Mid ...American Review of Sociology
Federal Court Processing
RESEARCH STRATEGY
collar and corporate crime since the early 1970s renews the need for research
into whether the criminal justice system has in fact shown a history of dif...
ferential treatment for white-collar and corporate offenders. More impor-
tantly, does such a pattern appear to be the case as we move into the middle
of the 1980s?The purpose of this research is to reveal whether official court
responses to traditional economic common crimes, white..collar crimes, and
corporate crimes have shifted over the past three decades. It is of central
concern whether the number of cases of each of the three types of law..
violating behavior coming to the attention of the courts has changed, and
whether the severity of sentencing for each has shifted. In sum, does one
observe a constant pattern of preferential treatment of white..collar and cor..
. porate offenders across-time, or have the responses to these activities gone
through changes in court processing?
STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM
experienced differential treatment by the government and criminal justice
system at both the operational and policy levels.
While one might easily summarize the history of the American response"
to white ..collar and corporate crime as one of toleration on the part of the·
public, victims, criminal justice system, and government, changes have been
occurring. Most notably, the criminal justice system's response to these ac...
tions has begun to shift over the past ten to fifteen years. This alteration
in policy appears to reflect changes in public opinion surrou~dingthe i~s~e.: '.
For example, Skoler (1980:65) notes that "after the consclousness~ralslng
ordeal of Watergate" had begun to settle into the hearts and minds of
Americans, the (now defunct) Law Enforcement Assistance Administration
began to provide funds to researchers wishing to develop crime control pro~
grams and strategies aimed at white..collar and, to a lesser extent, corporate~.
crime. In addition, in the 1970s and early 1980s, the FBI and the U.S. Depart- In order to assess whether white-collar and corporate offenders are treated
ment ofJustice began to refer to white-collar and corporate crime as among differently than their contemporaries engaged in common property crimes,
their top investigative priorities. ..•. this investigation focuses upon national prosecution, adjudication, andS~cial scientists have provided research support for the necessity of this ~sentencing data for each of the three types of law-violating behavior. Despite
shift in criminal justice policy. Rossi et al. (1974), Schrager and Short (1980)" ; shortcomings in the availability of official data on the processing of white-
and Rand, et al. (1983), for example, indicate that although members of ~,collar and corporate offenders relative to common property crime offenders,
the public often view white-collar and corporate offenses to be somewhat.. ;:one useful source of official data exists: The Annual Report of the Director
less serious or problematic than violent street crime, they often considerr Lof the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts. While this report provides
economic crimes perpetrated by societal elites to be about equal in severity~"fdetailed information on the number of offenders processed annually for each
to the economically/materialistically-motivated offenses committed by the, {type of offense considered, it has the drawback of being a step removed
traditionalor common crime offender..Research has also pointed out th~~' ., {fromthe entry level into the criminal justice system. Therefore, it is subject"th~ corporare and white-collar offenders respond to public condemnation;, lt~ the biases of unofficial police and public/organizational actions which
and scrutiny, as well as to court proceedings, in many instances (see Fisse ~:,influence the number and types ofoffenders coming under court jurisdiction.
and Braithwaite 1983· Stotland et al., 1980). This awakening public con~C;Thisbias should favor the inclusion of common crime offenders due to the
cern over the consequences of elite deviance has led such writers as Meier:~historical definition of the role of policing, and to the fact that most cor-
and Short (1982), Little (1983), Fisse and Braithwaite (1983), and Stotland ,.£porate and white-collar offenders are less likely to be brought to the atten-
et al. (1980) to conclude that today's public does consider white-collar and: ;£tion of the police when discovered by an employer, victim, or other
corporate crime to be serious issues, and that the criminal justice syste~:T. 4rc~rporation.
and government must become more proactive in their control. The public. ~. For ease of comparison, the investigation is limited to the considera-
has, in effect, provided the government and its agencies with a mandate.l t~tion of three forms of white-collar, corporate, and common crimes which
to constrain elite deviance. The question is whether the government hasAL ~.are primarily motivated by economic considerations. Moreover, the study
followed through on this mandate. .:~;!l··:I~ focused strictly upon felony offenses in order to concentrate upon the
The increase in public and apparent governmental concern over whlte;'.;{,;:~moreserious, but nonviolent offenders within each offense category. The
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white...collar offenses investigated are embezzlement, fraud, and forgerv/.
counterfeiting. The corporate offenses to be examined are antitrust viola..,
tions, violations of the Pure Food and Drug Act, and violations of the U.S.. ·
Motor Carrier Act. Finally, the common crime economic offenses under
consideration are burglary, larceny...theft, and motor vehicle theft. Aggregate
data is obtained for each category of offense from the Annual Report of the,
Director of the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts for the fiscal years end..'
ing June 30, 1964, 1974, and 1984. ,
A potential shortcoming of the present research design is that it can .... .:
not determine, on the basis of official aggregate data, how many of the white-,
collar crime defendants were actually lower ...versus upper...status persons. Nor,.
can the proportion of persons brought to the attention of the courts fCl.~~'
traditional or common crime offenses who are actually upper...status per-,
sons be ascertained from such data. For example, the data do not indicate-
what proportion of the embezzlers processed by the courts during any given
year are high...status executives and how many are lower...level employees (e.g.,
cashiers, tellers, etc.). Despite this inescapable flaw in the data, comparison.
across categories will yield useful information on the actions generally taken..
by the criminal justice system against each of the three forms oflaw..violating
behavior.
DISCUSSION
Table 1 provides information on the number of felony cases filed I~X
U.S. District Courts for the nine offenses under consideration. At first glance.'
it can be observed that the number of white...collar offenders having pro-,
ceedings initiated against them has grown throughout the period under study,'
while the number of common crime property offenders has declined. No,
major trend can be observed in the processing of corporate offenders at the
court in...take level, however, due to incomplete data. For the selected offenses"
under consideration, while 51 percent of the filings were for white...collar.
crime in 1964, this figure climbed to 70 percent of all cases filed in 1984.~l·
The most prevalent white collar violations reviewed by the courts in boch.
1964 and 1974 were forgery counterfeiting (46 percent of all white ...collar cases!'
24 percent of all selected offense filings in 1964; 48 percent vs. 29 percent
in 1974). In 1984 the most frequently processed white...collar cases involved
fraud (61 percent of all white...collar cases; 43 percent of all selected offense..
filings). The most frequent common crime economic offenses considered"
by the courts shifted from motor vehicle theft in 1964 (62 percent of all.
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common crime cases; 31 percent of all selected offenses) to larcenytheft in
1974 (63 percent vs. 24 percent) and 1984 (88 percent vs. 25 percent). Due
to missing data for the corporate offenses, all that one may conclude from
Table 1 is that there has been a slight downturn in the number of such
cases being brought to the attention of the courts between 1974 and 1984.
This suggests that there may actually have been a lessened tendency for
the courts to initiate proceedings against corporate offenders as time has
progressed, rather than an increase in court processing of such cases as one
would expect had public concerns become a part of administrative policy.
The overall image one receives from Table 1 is that the U.S. District Courts
have become more active in the prosecution of white...collar criminals over
the 1970s and 1980s, while having slightly decreased their processing of com...
mon crime and corporate offenders.
The number of defendants disposed of in U.S. District Courts for each
of the three years is presented in Table 2. Although the numerical and per...
centage distribution of defendants differs slightly from the number of cases
filed (Table 1), presumably due to past cases being decided in court and
more recent cases not yet having been decided, the ratio of white ...collar (1964,
47 percent of all defendants; 1974, 59 percent; 1984, 69 percent), to cor...
porate (1964, 9 percent; 1974,4 percent; 1984,2 percent), to common crime
(1964,44 percent; 1974, 37 percent; 1984, 28 percent) offenders remains largely
unchanged. This data indicates that the relative percentage of corporate
and common crime defendants brought before the courts has decreased,
while the percentage of white...collar defendants has increased dramatically
over the past three decades.
One may also observe some changes in the number of individuals com...
ing before the courts within each of the three major categories of law...violating
behavi~r. For example, in 1964 the most prevalent common ~ri~e economic
offense considered by the courts was motor vehicle theft (63 percent of all
common crime cases), while larceny...theft became the most typical common
crime offense before the courts in 1974 (63 percent) and 1984 (87 percent).
Among the white...collar crimes, forgery/counterfeiting (44 percent of all
white..collar defendants) and fraud (41 percent) defendants were about equally
likely to come before the court in 1964 and 1974 (forgery/counterfeiting,
47 percent; fraud, 36 percent). In 1984, those accused of fraud (62 percent)
became the clear majority of white..collar defendants. Finally, among the
corporate offenses, antitrust cases came to replace Food and Drug Act and
Motor Carrier Act violations in 1984 as the most commonly processed cor...
porate offenses. In summary, not only has there been a tendency for fewer
31
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common crime and corporate cases and more white...collar cases to come
before the courts, but the most prevalent type of offense within each category
has shifted over time.
Table 2 also provides information on the adjudication of cases for each
type of offense. This data reveals that about the same proportion of white...
collar (1964, 87 percent of all white...collar defendants; 1974, 81 percent; 1984,
84 percent), common crime (1964,91 percent of all common crime defen...
dants; 1974,79 percent; 1984,82 percent), and corporate (1964,'87 percent;
1974, 85 percent; 1984, 83 percent) offenders were convicted within any
, given year. That is, the courts do not appear to have allowed any greater
proportion of common crime, white...collar, or corporate offenders to escape
conviction. It can be noted, however, that while the lowest rates of convic...
.rion for common crime and white...collar offenses occurred in 1974, there
has been a small but steady decline in the conviction rates for corporate
offeI?-d¢rs. This suggests that corporate offenders are experiencing a declin...
"ing probability that criminal sanctions will be imposed upon them. This
;. decline appears contradictory to governmental policy statements and public
'_ concerns, while the increase in conviction rates for common crime and white...
: collar offenses in 1984 seems more in line with the shift in public opinion
: and governmental policy.
.:-:--Table 2 also revealsthat while approximately the same percentage of
~: those failing to be convicted for each category of offense had their cases
: dropped prior to trial in 1964, major shifts occurred in 1974 and 1984.
~'Although the probability of having one's case dropped prior to trial grew
{:for white...collar (1964, 72 percent of those failing to be convicted for white...
~:collar offenses had their case dropped prior to trial; 1974, 83 percent; 1984,
?082 percent) defendants, it declined substantially for corporate offenders (1964,
r~.70 percent; 1974, 90 percent;' 1984, '41 percentj.tThis suggests,' that over
:.the past three decades, corporate offenders have been less likely to have
~,their cases dropped prior to trial as compared to the other categories of defen...
~. dants considered herein. Thus, it would appear that when corporate crime
foffenders escape conviction it is more likely to have occurred as a conse...
}quence of the trial process, while white...collar and common crime defen..
;:dants are more likely to have escaped conviction during the pre ...tri-al stages
~,~of processing.
~" Finally, as one might expect, the vast majority of convictions come as
~:the result of guilty and nolo contendre pleas for all categories of offense.
f:;The greatest cross ...time change occurred among those charged with corporate
foffenses who in 1964 (97 percent) were somewhat more likely to have been
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VJ Table 2: Felony Defendants Disposed Of In U.S. District Courts By Selected Offenses ~~
TOTAL
0.:
>DEFENDANTS NOT CONVICTED CONVICTED S
1964* N % A B Total C D Total
n>
'"1
Not Convicted Convicted n"P'
n % n 0/0 =:3
- -
- - ~
n>
Common Crime Offenses
<:(;"
BURGLARY 277 3 16 10 26 9 234 17 251 91
~
0
LARCENY..THEFT 2861 33 232 102 334 12 2311 216 2527 88 I'-'t-\
MOTOR VEHICLE THEFT 5456 63 293 97 390 7 4757 309 5066 93
(f)
0
Totals 8594 99 541 209 750 (9)+ 7302 542 7844 (91)+ n0"0
Q'Q
White..Collar Offenses "<
EMBEZZLEMENT 1311 14 50 30 80 6 1181 50 1231 94
FRAUD 3817 41 543 218 761 20 2609 447 3056 80
FORGERY..COUNTERFEITING 4080 44 255 80 335 8 3476 269 3745 92
Totals 9208 99 848 328 1176 (13)+ 7266 766 8032 (87)+
Corporate Offenses
ANTITRUST VIOLAnONS 208 12 24 41 65 31 137 6 143 69
FOOD/DRUG LAW VIOLAnONS 572 34 84 9 93 16 450 29 479 84
MOTOR CARRIER ACT 909 54 41 15 56 6 838 15 853 94
Totals 1689 100 149 65 214 (13)+ 1425 50 1475 (87)+
I! ' , · ·Y• .~. . : ~ " . .' ';";.
.." j;. :.,..
*Adapted from: Administration Office of the U.S. Courts, 1964: Table D4;- 4.?6...s7.
,ACase Dismissed '. B,Not Convicted by Court or Jury CConvicted ~by -OuHty::or Nolo Contendre Plea
;:;~;/t~i,i,;~;,~C6~vi~ted by~C?ur~,ot,J~fY,i:)0~atego~y ~~erageD '. !' t! ').; . ~ .. " >
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convicted by plea than they were in 1984 (89 percent).
In terms of sentencing, some major differences in the treatment of the
three categories of offenders are found (Table 3). Although the probability
of imprisonment has increased for corporate (1964, 2 percent of all con--
victed corporate offenders received prison sentences; 1974, 5 percent; 1984,
14 percent) and white-collar (1964,39 percent; 1974,36 percent; 1984,41
percent) offenders, the probability of incarceration for common crime
economic offenders (1964, 61 percent; 1974, 50 percent; 1984,47 percent)
has decreased. Even so, common crime offenders have still been more likely
to be sentenced to prison throughout the past three decades.
Moreover, while the average length of incarceration meted out to all
three groups of offenders has increased over the period, the average length
of incarceration for white-collar offenders (1964, 19.4 months; 1974, 23.0;
1984, 39.1) has remained about half that received by common crime offeders
(1964,36.3 months; 1974,42.0; 1984,59.8). Not only have corporate crime
offenders seldom been sentenced to prison, when it does occur their sentences
are the shortest of all three groups (1984, 7.8 months). Thus, white collar
and corporate offenders have received and apparently continue to receive
lesser penalties in our nation's federal courts when compared to common
crime economic offenders. Turning attention towards the individual offenses
within each of the three major categories, it can be observed that the corn-
rn~ mon crime offense with the highest probability of imprisonment, as well
8 as the offense with the longest average sentences, is burglary. In contrast,
u:i the greatest probability of imprisonment and longest average sentence for
j white-collar offenses was for forgery/counterfeiting. No discernible pattern
..s emerges among the corporate offenses. While the offenses most likely to
~ .._.. result in imprisonment ip.)964 were..Foadan,dDrug.Actviolations, it was
~ antitrust law violations which garnered the greatest likelihood of imprison-
~ ment in 1974 and 1984. Those convicted of Food ad Drug Act violations
~ received the longest average sentences among corporate offenders (1964, 9.4
"~ months; 1974, data missing; 1984, 12.5 months).
.,
"2· Given the large proportion of persons sentenced to prison for common
"6 crime economic offenses, it comes as no surprise that a far greater propor-
~ tion of white-collar offenders (1964,52 percent; 1974,60 percent; 1984,56
8 percent) received sentences limited to probation than did their common
o~ crime counterparts (1964, 38 percent; 1974,49 percent; 1984,49 percent).
~ Relative to the two other categories of criminality, corporate offenders are
g. unlikely to be sentenced to probation. However, just as they are more like-~ Iy today than in the past to be sentenced to prison for their activities, the
*
37
Mid-American Review of Sociology Federal Court Processing
39
CONCLUSION
received sentences involving deportation, life imprisonment, or had their
fines and/or prison sentences suspended (see Table 3 under the headin
"Other Sentences"). g
38
corporate offender is now more likely to be placed on probation (1964, li~
percent; 1974, 18 percent; 1984, 34 percent). Unlike incarceration, the gap
between the average term of probation for common crime offenders (1984'
37.5 months) relative to white-collar offenders (1984,39.0 months) is much
narrower. Corporate offenders receive the shortest average probationary
sentences (1984,29.1 months). Among corporate offenders, Motor Carrier
Act violations c~rried the longest period of supervision in 1984 (34.3 months),- - : The recent changes in public attitudes and governmental policy toward
and those convicted of Food and Drug Act violations (23.1 months) receiv- , w~it~-col,lar ~nd corpo;ate crime appear to have had some impact upon the
ed the shortest period of supervision. Among the white-collar offenses pro;cnmmal Justice system s response to these activities. One indication of this
bationary sentences were longest for forgery/counterfeiting (40.0 months) is that, of the offenses considered, the majority of case filings were for white-
and shortest for fraud (37.4 months). For offenders convicted of common :.{ollar offenses. The data on conviction rates also suggests that the courts
crimeeconomic offenses, those convicted of motor vehicle theft were awarded' pursued all ~hree types of offenses with approximately equal vigor and,
the longest probationary sentences (44.0 months), and those convicted of- therefore, did not favor white-collar and corporate offenders in case
larceny-theft received the shortest length of supervision (31.2 months),''." ,disposition.
Fines were infrequently used by the U.S. District Courts as a sole means' - This is where the similarity in processing ends, however. When sen-
of punishment throughout the period. Corporate crime offenders (1964,78 oJen~ing is considered, the common crime economic offender is clearly at
percent received a fine as the only penalty; 1974, 74 percent; 1984, 51 per~:a disadvantage. Not only have those convicted of common crime offenses
cent) were farmore likely to have received a fine as their only form of punish-: ~ ...been more likely to receive prison sentences, they were generally sentenced
ment as compared to white-collar (1964, 8 percent; 1974, 3 percent; 1984,- ~IO longer periods of incarceration. This indicates that white-collar and cor-
2 percent) or common crime property offenders (1964, 1 percent; 1974,1 \porate offenders have received and continue to receive preferential treat-
percent; 1984,3 percent). Among the nine offenses considered, fines weir j:ment by the criminal justice system at the court level into the 1980s. More-
most commonly administered in antitrust cases in 1964 (94 percent of suck ~over, those offenders most closely linked to corporate crime have been the
cases received only a fine), for violations of the Motor Carrier Act in 1974' i}east likely to be imprisoned for their actions and, if incarcerated, have receiv-
(89 percent), and were about equally applied to Food and Drug Act viola- ied the least restrictive sentences. Thus, while it appears that white-collar
tions (53 percent) and antitrust cases (54 percent) in 1984.:,': jand corporate offenders are no more or less likely to have been acquitted
In sum, with few exceptions, common crime offenders convicted of ;or to have ~ad their cases dismissed, they have generally been the recipients
economically-motivated crimes .weregenerallv more likely to have been ,ofmore lenient sentences in our courts. Although incarceration rates have
sentenced to prison and to be sentenced to longer periodsof ~onfine~ent- ;i~creased for ~.oth, offenses and prison sentences have lengthened, judges
than were white-collar offenders, and white collar offenders were more likely - fstlll tend t? utilize fm~s and probation in dealing with these offenses. Though
to be imprisoned than corporate offenders. Corporate offenders brought "thetrend ill th: data is toward a more equitable treatment of property crime
to the attention of the courts have disproportionately received probation :offender~ co~mng to the attention of the courts from all three categories
or fines as the sole means of punishment. Although the proportion of white:' Wf law-violating behavior, the actual culmination of this "equity" process
collar (1964,60 percent; 1974, 63 percent; 1984, 58 percent) and corporate;has yet to be fulfilled. The only white-collar offense for which this did not
(1964, 95 percent; 1974, 92 percent; 1984, 85 percent) offenders receiving ;hold true was forgery-counterfeiting, an offense theoretically more open to
decisions limited to one or the other of these two actions has decreased over ~~.~embers of all status backgrounds. Those sentenced to prison for this offense
the past three decades, the proportion of common crime offenders receiv- ¥d,ld, however, receive shorter terms of imprisonment than did those con-
ing fines and probation has increased (1964,39 percent; 1974, 50 percent]. llcted of the common crime offenses of burglary and motor vehicle theft.
1984, 52 percent). The courts have clearly favored the corporate and white- t I~ conclusion~ while such writers as Balkan et al. (1980), Conklin (1977),
collar offender with less severe penalties. Only a small minority of offend~r~ rnd Simon and Eitzen (1982) have clearly pointed out that white-collar and
~ Table 3: Felony Defendants Sentenced In U.S. District Courts By Selected Offenses ~0
SENTENCED TO SENTENCED TO FINE 0:\
PRISON PROBATION ONLY OTHERc »a(D
. TOTAL Averageb Average t-1n·
SENTENCED in in ~~
N Na % Months N % Months N % N % ~(D
1964* <ro·
~
Common Crime Offenses I 0
BURGLARY 251 152 60 50.0 97 39 0 0 2 1 ~~~ en
LARCENY~THEFr 2527 1162 46 25.6 1303 52 ~~ 39 1 23 1 0o
MOTOR VEHICLE THEFr 5066 3477 69 33.3 1571 31 ~~ 2 0 19 0 o'
Totals 7844 4788 (61)+ (36.3)+ 2971 (38)+ ~~ 64 (1)+ 44 (0)+ 0(JQ
-..c:::
White~Collar Offenses
EMBEZZLEMENT 1231 259 21 14.2 953 77 ~~ 10 1 9 1
FRAUD 3056 787 26 15.7 1587 52 ~~ 646 21 36 1
FORGERY~COUNTERFElTING 3745 2050 55 28.3 1661 44 ~~ 7 0 27 1
Totals 8032 3096 (39)+ (19.4)+ 4201 (52)+ ~~ 663 (8)+ 72 (1)+
Corporate Offenses
ANTITRUST VIOLAnONS 143 3 2 ~~ 5 3 ~~ 135 94 0 0
FOOD/DRUG LAW VIOLATIONS 479 30 6 9.4 138 29 ~~ 289 60 22 5
MOTOR CARRIER ACT 853 0 0 0.0 105 12 ~~ 721 84 27 3
Totals 1475 33 (2)+ ~~ 248 (17)+ ~~ 1145 (78)+ 49 (3)+
*Adapted from: Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, 1964: Table D~5: 259~60.
-Inforrnation missing +category average aincludes sentences of more than six months followed by a term of probation
b excludes :sp1i~, .indeteqninat~,. and::', '..'Cincludes. deportation,suspended.sentences, imprisonment :tor four days or less or for. time
, life sentences .' .. '.,. :. -"" .."t.,' ": alreadyserved, retciftted and suspendedfines, and life'sentences.':· " ,! . ":, I
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THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF FRAUD:
DRAMATURGY, CARNEGIE AND PUPPET THEATER
John F. Welsh
Pittsburg State University
Mid-American Review of Sociology, 1986, Vol. XI, No.1:
THE PRIVATIZED DRAMATURGY OF
CAPITALIST CIVIL SOCIETY.
Sauntering through the typical franchise bookstore in the typical subur..
ban shopping mall, the radical social psychologist cannot help chuckling
:. and grimacing at the titles of the slick paperbacks usually found in the "self..
improvement" and "Psychology" sections. A battery of titles exist giving
evidence of a preoccupation with mastering the principles of human rela ..
dons as they exist in their current alienated forms. How to Sell Yourself, The
"Power of Positive Thinking, Winning Through Intimidation, Looking Out for
: Number One, Dress for Success, The Executive Look, Office Politics, Power! How
to Get It, How to Use it, Your Erroneous Zones, and Guerilla Tactics in the
i;Job Market are titles of books and workshops which speak of a concern on
). the part of those in bureaucratic and/or capitalist societies attempting to
;succeed. Furthermore, all of these indicate that interpersonal strategies ex..
-ist which can make success easier to attain. Of course, "success" in the pres..
'ent American lexicon refers typically to the crude possession of power,
~money, prestige, and the commodities which accrue from these. In addi..
,- tion, these titles and their contents suggest that the person can affect .. to
. ~"s(jIne quantitative extent- the course ofhis/her fortunes through the develop-
.:,ment of a style, an image or a presentation of self that is acceptable to those
{who control access to success and the valued commodities. In these so..called
;.'self..improvement books are all of the elements of a fraudulent dramaturgy
~'at the level of interpersonal relations in everyday life. With the specific
F,reference to popular culture these provide one of the best illustrations of
;the existence of a dramaturgical society (Young and Massey, 1977). Cer..
)ainly, they indicate that human interaction has become reduced in many
~instances to a ritualistic acting out of externally prepared scripts.
. To the extent that persons read these self...improvement books, attend
t'the various workshops and seminars, and generally orient their thoughts
~and behaviors as they are so taught, these efforts constitute an important
